














Ali Abdel Gadir Ali,
1 










                                                 
1  I am grateful to Ahmed Al-Kawaz, Khalid Affan, Gary McMahon and the editors of this volume for 
comments on as earlier draft and to Mr. Jamal Hamid for research assistance.  I am also grateful to 
Professor Eltahir M. Nur, of the University of Khartoum, Sudan,  for presenting the paper on my behalf at 










The paper investigates the effect of globalization on the Arab region. Understanding the process of globalization as increased 
international economic integration three measures of globalization are used: the rate of increase of trade/GDP ratio; the ratio 
of the stock of foreign direct investment to GDP; and the number of immigrants to the US. Inequality in the distribution of 
income is looked at in terms of the average income of the poor and the Gini coefficient. It is shown that (a) the Arab region 
has been left out of the process of globalization;  (b) despite the problems involved in getting high quality data on income, or 
expenditure, distribution, there is evidence to show that the Arab region boasts a fairly high degree of income inequality;  (c) 
the time trend of the degree of inequality in Arab countries, however, remains problematic with official data showing that 
inequality has declined over the 1990s decade; (d) the Arab poor, appropriately defined, stand to benefit from trade induced 
economic growth by about  50 percent of the increase in per capita income; and (e) there exists preliminary evidence of a 
direct causal link between globalization as measured by FDI/GDP ratio and immigration to the USA in such a way that FDI 
increases inequality while immigration reduces it. Increased   trade participation does not seem to affect inequality.   3
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I. Introduction: 
It has now become customary to assert that the term ￿globalization￿ means different things to 
different people. However, there seems to be general agreement that the term refers to the 
observed process of increased international economic integration driven largely by 
technological advances in transport and communications. Thus, for example, according to an 
active participant in the process the term means the ￿development of global financial markets, 
the growth of transnational corporations, and their increasing domination over national 
economies￿ (Soros (2002:1). In the succinct words of Stiglitz (2002: ix) globalization means 
￿the removal of barriers to free trade and the closer integration of national economies￿
2.    
In a recent report the World Bank (2002: 23-51) provided a summary of the history, and 
economic effects, of ￿globalization￿. It is noted that ￿globalization￿ occurs through trade 
(measured relative to world income), migration (proxied by the number of immigrants to the 
United States), and capital flows (proxied by the stock of foreign capital in developing 
countries relative to their GDP).  Three waves of globalization have been identified: 1870-
1914, 1945-1980 and 1980 to the present. Central to all identified globalization waves was 
the reduction in transport costs. Strictly speaking, only the second and third waves of 
globalization are relevant for the developing countries including those of the Arab region
3.     
According to the World Bank￿s analysis, during the second wave of globalization trade in 
manufacturing between advanced countries was substantially freed of restrictions and 
transport costs fell by a third between 1950 and 1970. The developing countries, however, 
did not participate in, or benefit from, this wave. For developing countries it is noted that 
despite the fact that  ￿per capita income growth recovered from inter-war slowdown, it was 
substantially slower than in the rich economies. The number of poor people continued to rise, 
but non-income dimensions of poverty improved- notably rising life expectancy and rising 
school enrollments. In terms of equity, within developing countries in aggregate there was 
little change either between countries or within them. As a group, developing countries were 
left behind by developed countries￿ (World Bank (2002: 31)).  
 
 
                                                 
2 For a similar definition see Rodrik (1999: vii) who defines it as ￿the whirlwind of technological change and 
liberalized trade and investment that is bringing huge gains in communications and efficiency, and effecting 
huge shifts in production and wealth￿. From a political economy perspective Gray (2002: 55) notes that one 
possible definition of globalization is the ￿worldwide spread of modern technologies of industrial 
production and communication of all kinds across frontiers- in trade, capital, production and information￿.  
3 The World Bank￿s report draws on the recent work of Williamson (1997) and Lindert and Williamson  
(2001) on the history of globalization and inequality.  
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The third wave of globalization was judged to have been distinctive in that (a) a large group 
of developing countries broke into global markets; (b) other developing countries became 
increasingly marginalized in the world economy and suffered declining incomes and rising 
poverty; and, (c) international migration and capital movements became substantial. Among 
the developing countries a group of 24 countries were identified as having ￿globalized￿ 
during this third wave. The measure used to identify the countries that have ￿globalized￿ is 
the increase in the trade (exports+ imports) to GDP ratio over the period 1970-1997. Of these 
the only Arab country is Jordan. Thus, the countries of the region have been left out of the 
third wave of globalization
4.       
To investigate the effect of globalization on inequality in the distribution of consumption expenditure 
or income, as appropriate proxies for the standard of living and hence the welfare of individuals, it is 
perhaps important to note that there exist a number of alternative measures of inequality in the 
specialized literature. As is well known the most widely used measure of inequality in the 
distribution of income is the Gini coefficient
5. This measure varies from zero (where every 
person in the society has the same income, indicating the absence of inequality and 
representing conditions of perfect equality) to unity (where one person gets all the income 
and the rest receive nothing, indicating the presence of complete inequality). The Gini co-
efficient is frequently expressed in percentages, for ease of understanding.
6. Thus, higher 
values of the Gini coefficient indicate higher degrees of inequality in the distribution of the 
relevant attribute.   
Five major results on the effect of globalization on inequality are noted (World Bank (2002: 
46-51)): (i) that globalization has been equalizing in OECD countries ￿as inequality between 
countries has radically decreased￿, but there was increased inequality in some countries 
possibly due to domestic policies
7; (ii) for the OECD countries and the new ￿globalizers￿ 
taken together, overall inequality has also declined; (iii) within-country inequality has 
increased in the ￿new globalizers￿, due to the increased inequality in China that accounts for 
one third of the population of this group of countries; (iv) for a sample of 137 countries it is 
found that there exists ￿no relationship between changes in openness and changes in 
                                                 
4 The other 23 globalized developing countries are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cote d￿Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Thailand, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.    
5 The Gini coefficient is a Lorenz curve based measure. The Lorenz curve is drawn on the basis of the 
cumulative percentage shares of the population (on the horizontal axis) against their corresponding 
cumulative percentage share of income (on the vertical axis), where the population groups are arrayed from 
poorest to richest. The curve joining the plotted points is the Lorenz curve. If income is equally distributed 
such that every gets the mean income then the Lorenz curve coincides with the diagonal joining the point 
zero on the horizontal axis to the point 100 percent on the vertical axis; otherwise, the curve traces points 
that lie below the diagonal. The ratio of the area between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve to the area of 
the unit triangle defines the Gini coefficient.    
6 For other measures of inequality see Sen (1997: 24-46) and Kakwani (1980: 63-95). In Sen￿s notation let n 
be the number of people in the population and yi , and xi be the income and the share of income of person i 
and let ￿ be the average level of income. The statistical measures of inequality include the following (a) the 
range:  E = [maxi yi ￿ mini yi] /￿; (b) the relative mean deviation: M = Σ | ￿ ￿ yi |/ n￿;  (c) the variance: V = 
Σ (￿ ￿ yi )
2/ n; (d) the coefficient of variation: C = V
0.5/￿;  and, (e) the standard deviation of the logarithms 
of income: SL = [Σ (log￿ ￿ logyi )
2/ n]0.5 . Another famous measure of inequality is known as Theil￿s 
measure based on the idea of entropy and is defined as T = Σ xi log nxi . The most famous welfare based 
measure of inequality is Atkinson￿s measure which relies on the idea of the equally distributed equivalent 
income, ye, defined as that level of per capita income which if enjoyed by everybody would make total 
welfare exactly equal to the total welfare generated by the actual distribution of income. Atkinson￿s 
measure is given by A = 1 ￿ (ye/ ￿).        
7 For an alternative view of the time trend on inequality, and causal factors, in OECD countries see Atkinson 
(1999).   5
inequality, whether openness is measured by the share of trade in income, the Sachs-Warner 
measure of openness, average tariff rates, or capital controls￿
8; and (v) although on average 
openness does not affect inequality, in low income countries it is associated with greater 
inequality
9.        
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the current debate on the possible effects of 
globalization on inequality by looking at these effects on the Arab region
10. In section (2) a 
review of recent empirical findings relevant to the issue of the effect of globalization on 
inequality is presented. The most important result in this respect is that which attempted to 
establish an indirect link between globalization and the average income of the bottom 20 
percent of the population. The indirect link is obtained by observing that increased trade 
volumes, under ￿globalization￿, increases the rate of growth of per capita income and that the 
average income of the poor increases one-for-one as per capita income. Section (3) looks at 
the current state of globalization of Arab countries. Three World Bank￿s globalization 
measures are used: the annual rate of increase of the trade/GDP ratio over the period 1980-
2000; the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) to GDP in 1999; and, the number of Arab 
immigrants to the US over the period 1990-2000. Section (4) presents the evidence on the 
state of inequality in the distribution of income in the Arab countries. The section notes the 
constraints imposed by the availability of data nonetheless but reports available results on the 
state and time trend of inequality in the region. Section (5) presents results on the effect of 
globalization on inequality in the region; both indirect and direct effects are reported. Section 
(6) offers a summary and few concluding remarks.   
 
II. Globalization and Inequality: Recent Empirical Results:  
Given the time structure of ￿globalization￿ noted above the investigation of its effect on 
inequality is likely to be associated with the time trend of inequality at the level of the world. 
Interesting in this respect is to note the results of Li, Squire and Zou (1998) who used a recent 
set of data to test two propositions regarding income inequality. The first is that income 
inequality does not display a time trend; and, the second is that it varies significantly across 
                                                 
8 This result is based on the work of Dollar and Kraay (2001-a). The investigation involved regressing the 
income share of the poorest 20 percent of the population on various measures of openness.  
 
9 This result is due to Ravallion (2001) who applied the concept of convergence used in the empirical growth 
literature which requires regressing the observed change in inequality between two dates on the initial level 
of inequality in a test equation of the form ∆Gi = a + b Gi0+ ei ; where G is the Gini coefficient or any other 
inequality measure and the subscript i denotes the country. There will be inequality convergence if b is 
negative and significantly different from zero.  Using 86 inequality spells for 21 countries Ravallion (2001: 
13) concludes that evidence is found of inequality convergence, with a tendency for within-country 
inequality to fall (rise) in countries with initially high (low) inequality. It seems that countries are tending to 
become more equally unequal, heading towards a Gini index of around 40%￿.   
10 According to GDN regional perspectives the coverage of this paper should have been the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region, which includes Iran and Turkey. Confining the analysis to the Arab region is 
deliberate in view of the fact that in most of the analysis dealing with inequality and poverty issues the 
MENA region is usually represented by six Arab countries: Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and 
Yemen (see, for example, Chen and Ravallion (2000)). The reason for this practice in the relevant literature 
is the unavailability of high quality distribution data for the other countries in the MENA region. On the 
other hand some of the countries that belong to the Arab region but do not belong to MENA are usually 
classified as Sub-Saharan Arab countries:  Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Sudan. For regional coverage 
similar to ours see Page and van Gelder (2002: 2 footnote 2) who confine MENA to the six Arab countries 
noted above in addition to Iraq.       6
countries. According to their interpretation the significance of the two propositions is that 
￿barring any fundamental socio-political change, poverty reduction will depend crucially on 
the rate of economic growth. Given this, the significance of the second is that in inegalitarian 
economies the poor will enjoy a smaller share of any national increment in income than in 
more egalitarian ones￿(Li, Squire and Zou (1998:26)). The test is performed on a sample of 
49 developed and developing countries over the period 1947-1994. The sample is restricted to 
those countries for which high quality information is available for at least four years during 
the sample period
11. The only Arab country included in the sample is Tunisia
12.  
Both analysis of variance and regression were used to test the two propositions and the results 
seem to support the two propositions. Without getting involved in the details of the two 
methods we note the summary of the regression results. The first proposition is confirmed on 
the basis of an F-test at the 5% level of significance where it is found that the Gini 
coefficients differ significantly across countries. Similarly, for time trends the authors find 
statistical support for the second proposition in 32 of the 49 countries. Of the remaining 
countries they find significant negative trends for seven countries and significant positive 
trends for 10 countries.  
The authors define ￿quantitatively small￿ time trends as ￿an annual change of less than 1% of 
the country￿s 1980 predicted Gini coefficient￿. On the basis of this they note that 10 of the 17 
countries with a significant time trend experienced quantitatively small changes in inequality. 
For the remaining 7 countries the authors observe a statistically large and quantitatively 
important time trend. The seven countries in question included Australia (with an initial Gini 
coefficient of 34.18% and a positive and significant annual rate of increase of 0.35%), Chile 
(with a Gini of 48.65% and a positive and significant time trend of 0.51%); China (with a 
Gini of 24.72% and a positive and significant time trend of 0.8%); France (with a Gini of 
34.22% and a negative and significant time trend of 0.58%); Italy (with a Gini of  31.48 and a 
negative and significant time trend of 0.37%); New Zealand (with  Gini of 30.14% and a 
positive and significant time trend of 0.49%); and Poland (with a Gini of 21.12 and a positive 
and significant time trend of 0.31%)
13. 
The results relating to the time trend are derived for countries for which relatively long time 
series observations on the inequality measure were available to permit the estimation of time 
trends. As such, therefore, they are difficult to generalize for the level of regions or the world. 
An alternative method for looking at trends in inequality has recently been proposed by 
Milanovic (2000) where, based on available representative household survey data, detailed 
calculations are made for regions as well as for the world for two points in time namely 1988 
and 1993.  The distribution of income, or expenditure, is then generated for various regions, 
and the world, on the basis of ranking representative individuals by per capita income or 
expenditure. For each country, starting with per capita income, or expenditure, in local 
currency relevant exchange rates are applied to get to incomes in international dollars (using 
purchasing power parity exchange rates, PPP) or in current dollars (using official exchange 
rates).  
                                                 
11 High quality data on income inequality are required to (a) be based on household surveys; (b) be based on 
comprehensive coverage of all sources of income or uses of expenditure; and, (c) be representative of the 
population at the national level i.e. not confined to sectors or groups of population (for details see Deininger 
and Squire (1996)). 
12 It is not clear, however, which reported Gini coefficients in the Deininger and Squire (1996) data base were 
used for Tunisia.  
13 For the details see Li, Squire and Zou (1998: 32 table 4). 
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The world is divided into five regions: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), 
Eastern Europe and the FSU (EEFSU), and Western Europe, North America and Oceania 
(WENACO).  The number of countries for which data was available differed between 1988 
and 1993, but the number of countries for which data was available for the two years is 91. 
This is called the common sample and the most important results are reported for this sample. 
The common sample covered 84.4% of the population of the world in 1988 and 84.2% in 
1993; it also covered 93.7% of GDP in current dollars in 1988 and 93.1% in 1993. In the 
common sample five Arab countries are included: Jordan (classified in Asia), Algeria, Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia (classified in Africa). The results for the common sample, using PPP 
per capita income or expenditure, are summarized in table (1).  
 
Table (1): Inequality in the World: 1988 and 1993 




Change in the Gini 
(percentage points) 
Annual Rate of 
Change of Gini (%) 
Africa 42.7  47.2  4.5  2.02 
Asia 55.9  61.8  5.9  2.02 
LAC 57.1  55.6  -1.5  -0.53 
EEFSU 25.6  46.4  20.8  12.63 
WENACO 37.1  36.6  -0.5  -0.27 
World 62.5  65.9  3.4  1.10 
Source: Milanovic (2000: tables 11 and 17). 
 
As is clear from the table in 1988 the regions characterized by the highest degree of 
inequality were LAC (with a Gini coefficient of 57.1%), Asia (55.9%) and Africa (42.7%) 
while the region with the lowest degree of inequality was EEFU, comprising the former 
socialist block, with a Gini coefficient of 25.6%. For the whole world a Gini coefficient of 
62.5% is calculated indicating a very high degree of inequality in the distribution of real 
income. By 1993 the table shows that inequality has increased in all regions except LAC and 
WENACO. The largest increase in inequality is recorded for EEFSU where the Gini 
increased by 20.8 percentage points in five years. The lowest increase is recorded for Africa 
where the Gini coefficient increased by 4.5 percentage points. On the other hand, the largest 
decline is recorded for LAC where the Gini coefficient declined by 1.5 percentage points. At 
the level of the world income inequality increased where the Gini increased from 62.5% in 
1988 to 65.9% in 1993 recording an increase of 3.4 percentage points in five years. This is a 
quantitatively significant increase in inequality with the annual rate of increase in the Gini 
coefficient being 1.1 per cent.   
Calculating the annual rate of change in the Gini coefficient the table also shows that for the 
regions where inequality has increased the annual rate of increase was quantitatively 
significant in the sense that the rates were in excess of value of one percent. In contrast, for 
the regions for which inequality declined the annual rates of change were less, in absolute 
value, than the critical value for quantitative significance. At the level of the world the 
recorded trend in inequality is also one of significant quantitative increase. 
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Be the above as it may, perhaps the most celebrated empirical result on the effect of 
globalization on inequality is that of Dollar and Kraay (2000-a and b; hereinafter DK). DK 
(2000-b) purported to show that the ￿income of the poor rises one-for-one with overall 
growth￿, where they define the poor as the bottom fifth of the population, and they note that 
this ￿general relationship between income of the bottom fifth of the population and per capita 
GDP holds in a sample of 80 countries covering four decades￿.  We hasten to note in this 
respect that the linear proportional relationship between the average income of any percentile 
group1 and overall average income is true by definition and as such does not require 
empirical testing. Thus our interest is in the DK results regarding the effect of ￿globalization￿ 
on the average income of the bottom 20 percent of the population as a measure of inequality.  
DK (2000-b: 22-23 and table 6) estimate a simple model where the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the per capita income of the bottom 20% with the logarithm of per capita income 
as the main explanatory variable. To this basic relationship alternative measures of openness, 
or ￿globalization￿, are added as explanatory variables. Three measures of ￿globalization￿ are 
used: the standard trade intensity measure (defined as exports plus imports as a percentage of 
GDP); Sachs and Warner measure of openness
14; and an IMF dummy variable ￿that denotes 
presence of capital controls￿. The results show that there is a positive and insignificant 
coefficient for the trade intensity measure (with an estimated coefficient of 0.004 and a 
standard error of 0.055); a negative and insignificant coefficient for the Sachs and Warner 
measure (with an estimated coefficient of ￿0.071 and absolute standard error of 0.047); and a 
negative and insignificant coefficient on the capital account restrictions measure (with an 
estimated coefficient of ￿0.013 and an absolute standard error of 0.065). Thus for all three 
measures of ￿globalization￿ there does not seem to exist a statistically significant effect on 
the per capita income of the bottom 20 percent of the population. Despite this DK (2000-b: 
22) are able to assert that the result for the trade intensity measure, combined with a result 
relating openness and growth, ￿indicates that trade openness is good for the poor: it increases 
mean income and the poor benefit one-for-one￿
15. Moreover, sing these results DK (2000-a: 
33) also conclude ￿we have found little evidence of a systematic effect of trade volumes on 
income inequality. Combining this observation with the results on the growth benefits of 
greater trade, we conclude that the balance of the evidence suggests that, on average, greater 
globalization is a force for poverty reduction￿
16.  
Instead of looking at the effect of ￿globalization￿ on the share of the bottom 20 percent of the 
population Milanovic (2002) investigated such effect on the whole distribution of income by 
taking the dependent variable as the ratio of per capita income of the various deciles to the 
overall per capita income. The investigation is done for levels of, as well as for changes in, 
these ratios for two years falling in the middle of the third wave of ￿globalization￿, namely 
1988 and 1993. Trade intensity (exports plus imports as a ratio of GDP), and the ratio of 
foreign direct investment to GDP are used as measures of globalization. Each of these 
                                                 
14 Sachs and Warner (1995) define a country as closed if it had any of the following: non-tariff barriers 
covering 40 percent or more of trade; average tariff rates of 40 percent or more; a black market premium of 
20 percent or more; a socialist country; or a state monopoly on major exports.  
15 DK (2000-b) title their sub-section carrying these results ￿globalization is good for the poor￿! Some of the 
empirical results on the growth benefits of trade have recently been summarized by Easterly (2001: 230): 
(a) closed economies are found to grow at 0.7 percent per capita per year compared to 4.5 percent per capita 
per year for open economies; (b) the growth rate of a previously closed economy will increase by one 
percentage point when it becomes open; (c) a one point rise in the share of trade to GDP raises per capita 
income by 2 percent.   
16 The Economist (2000-a and b; 2001) celebrated the result three times while Moore (2001) used the result to 
preach Arab delegates on the importance of working for the success of the Doha WTO meetings.   9
globalization measures is interacted with per capita income; in addition financial depth (the 
ratio of broad money to GDP) and an indicator of democracy are used as explanatory 
variables.  
The results for the change in the ratio between the two years did not establish any statistical 
significance for any of the chosen explanatory variables. Interesting results for the regression 
in levels, however, are reported. The results are reported for the cases where the regressions 
are run independently for each income group as well as the case where the estimation is done 
simultaneously using seemingly unrelated regression technique. For this latter case the ratio 
for the fifth income group is excluded. For the two cases the foreign direct investment 
variable, its interaction with the level of income and the financial depth variable are reported 
as having no significant effect on the respective income ratios.  
In addition to the above, and for the case of independent regressions, without regional 
dummies, the democracy variable has a negative and significant effect on the income ratios of 
the bottom seven deciles and a positive and significant effect on the income ratio of the top 
10 percent of the population. When regional dummies are introduced negative (positive) and 
significant effects are reported for the first and third deciles (top decile) with negative 
(positive) but insignificant effects reported for the remaining lower deciles up to the eight 
(ninth decile). When the regressions are done simultaneously democracy had a negative and 
significant effect on all deciles up to the eighth and positive and significant effect on the top 
decile with the effect on the ninth being positive but not significant.  
The trade intensity variable has a statistically significant effect on the income ratios but the 
effect is conditional on the level of development as reflected by per capita GDP. The relevant 
results for level estimation without regional dummies are summarized in  (2), where the 
dependent variable is the ratio of the deciles average income to overall average income and 
where the other explanatory variables are not shown. The number of observations is 113 for 
all deciles representing pooled observations from 1988 and 1993 obtained from 88 countries 
for which relevant data are available. All reported coefficients are significant at the 1 or 5 
percent levels of significance except for the coefficient of trade intensity of the eighth decile 
which is indicated with a star. 
 
















for GDP below 
Turning Point 
First  -0.108   0.00002   0.371  0.210  5400  Decreases 
Second  -0.185   0.00003   0.519   0.345  6167  Decreases 
Third  -0.203   0.00004   0.621  0.397  5075  Decreases 
Fourth -0.194  0.00004 0.761  0.391  4850  Decreases 
Fifth -0.177  0.00003  0.811 0.398 5900 Decreases 
Sixth -0.155  0.00003  0.921 0.381 5167 Decreases 
Seventh -0.116  0.00003  1.061  0.293  3867  Decreases 
Eighth -0.027*  0.00001 1.250  0.054  Na  Na 
Ninth 0.127  -0.00002  1.550  0.097  6350  Increases 
Tenth 1.037  -0.00021  2.180  0.368  4938  Increases 
  Source: Milanovic (2002: 15, table 1), and own calculation for the GDP turning point and the effect of 
globalization below the turning point. * Not statistically significant. NA: not applicable.    10
 
The effect of trade intensity on the income ratio of the various deciles can be obtained by 
differentiating the estimated equation with respect to trade intensity. The effect depends on 
the level of per capita GDP, which in the case of countries can be taken as a proxy for the 
level of development.  The critical levels of per capita GDP are calculated in the table and the 
effect is indicated for GDP below that value. Obviously, for countries with per capita GDP 
higher than the indicated critical value the effect on the income ratio of the various deciles 
will be opposite to that indicated in the table. For the eighth decile an increase in trade 
intensity increases the share of income. 
From the above observations it will be safe to conclude that for countries with per capita 
GDP less than US$3900 an increase in trade intensity, reflecting  ￿globalization￿, is likely to 
result in increased inequality in the sense of reducing the income ratio of each of the lowest 
seven deciles and increasing the income ratio of the top three deciles. ￿Openness would 
therefore seem to have a particularly negative impact on the poor and middle income groups 
in poor countries- which is directly opposite to what we would have expected based on 
theory￿ (Milanovic (2002: 12).   
From the above brief review it seems that we have two conflicting results on the effect of 
globalization on inequality: an indirect result purporting to show that ￿globalization is good 
for the poor￿, and a direct result that ￿openness has a negative effect on the poor and middle 
income groups￿.   
 
III. Globalization in the Arab Countries:  
To appreciate the status of the ￿globalization￿ of the Arab countries it is perhaps important to 
note that, despite their common cultural and historical heritage, these countries have very 
diverse characteristics in such key areas as the structures of the economies, level of 
development, geographic location, and type of governance and institutions. To highlight the 
economic diversity of the region, ERF (1998) grouped the countries of the region into four 
broad categories
17: mixed oil economies (MOE: Algeria and Iraq); Oil Economies (OE), 
which include the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE; diversified economies (DE: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Syria and Tunisia); and, primary export economies (PEE: Djibouti, Mauritania, 
Sudan and Yemen).  The 1996 distribution of population and GDP over these country groups 
was such that DE accounted for 48% of population and 28% of GDP; MOE accounted for 
21% of population and 24% of GDP; PEE accounted for 20% of population and only 3% of 
GDP; while OE accounted for only 11% of population and 46% of GDP. Intra-Arab diversity 
is also captured by differences in per capita GDP. Not surprisingly, OE ranks top on this scale 
with a per capita GDP of about US$9000 in 1996, followed by MOE (US$2400).  DE ranks 
third with a per capita GDP of US$1300 while PEE￿s per capita GDP amounted to only 
US$300. The production structures of the four groups differ as well. Thus, in 1996 the 
agricultural sector accounted for 24% and 23% of GDP in PEE and MOE, respectively, and 
for 16% in DE while it accounts for only 2.4% of GDP in OE.  The manufacturing sector 
                                                 
17 For lack of adequate data at the time   Libya, Palestinian territories, Somalia and Comoros were not 
included in the classification. We note in passing that such a classification scheme remains arbitrary but can 
be useful for the purposes of the analysis.      11
accounted for 14.4% of GDP in DE, 11% in MOE and OE, and 9% in PEE. Thus, none of the 
country groups of the region could be considered as industrialized (defining this stage in 
terms of a manufacturing sector contribution of 20% of GDP). Extractive industry, however, 
contributed fairly large shares in OE (35% of GDP) and MOE (27% of GDP)
18.  
The above noted diversity, it should be appreciated, will affect, among other things, the speed 
with which countries can integrate in the world economy and the current status of 
￿globalization￿ of each country
19. To ascertain such a status we used the World Bank￿s 
(2002) indicator of ￿globalization￿ and calculated the rate of growth of the trade/GDP ratio 
over the period 1980-2000 for each country for which relevant information is available. The 
detailed data set is provided in annex table (A.1).  
Judging Arab countries by the level of their trade intensity ratio in the year 2000 annex table 
(A.1) shows that three countries have such a ratio in excess of 100 percent (Bahrain 145%; 
Jordan 111%; and UAE 114%); another three countries have ratios in excess of 90% (Tunisia 
and Yemen 92%; and Mauritania 98%); and seven countries have ratios in excess of 60% 
(Algeria 64%; Kuwait 88%; Morocco 69%; Oman 81%; Qatar 78%; Saudi Arabia 75%; and, 
Syria 73%). The remaining five Arab countries have ratios less than 60% (Egypt 39%; 
Lebanon 51%; Libya 42%; Comoros 58%; and, Sudan 33%).  The annex table shows that the 
trade intensity ratio fluctuated in most of the Arab countries during the period under 
consideration. The time trend, and its statistical significance, is captured in the results 











                                                 
18 It is worth noting that most of the Arab countries (except the GCC and Syria) implemented structural 
adjustment programs since the 1980s with the objective of enhancing their production efficiency through 
various liberalization measures, including trade liberalization and privatization. Moreover, under the 
auspices of the League of Arab States an attempt has been made to liberalize trade between Arab countries 
within the context of WTO rules. The process to create an Arab Free Trade Area is still under way.     
19 Despite the fact that WTO membership is not used as a measure of globalization it should be noted that 
according to the WTO website information (as of December 19, 2000) WTO had a membership of 144 
countries as of 1
st January 2002. Eleven Arab countries were members at that date: Bahrain (1
st January 
1995); Djibouti (31
st May 1999); Egypt (30
th June 1995); Jordan (11
th April 2000); Kuwait (1
st January 
1995); Mauritania (31
st May 1995); Morocco (1
st January 1995); Oman (9
th November 1995); Qatar (1
st 
January 1995); Tunisia (29 March 1995); and UAE (1
st January 1995). Another five Arab countries were 
observers with a status of accession: Algeria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen.     12
Table (3): Globalization in the Arab Countries: Annual Growth Rates of Trade/GDP Ratios for a Sample of 
Arab Countries 1980-2000 
Country  Estimated Coefficient  Absolute t-value  Growth Rate (%)  Globalization Status 
Algeria -0.0004  0.0558  -0.04  Not  Globalized 
Bahrain -0.0257  9.2969  -2.57  Not  Globalized 
Comoros -0.0045  1.5574  -0.45  Not  Globalized 
Egypt -0.02315  3.7271  -2.32  Not  Globalized 
Jordan -0.0013  0.2559  -0.13  Not  Globalized 
Kuwait -0.0083  2.2644  -0.83  Not  Globalized 
Lebanon -0.0436  7.8787  -8.18  Not  Globalized 
Libya -0.0265  2.3233  -2.65  Not  Globalized 
Mauritania -0.0165  4.6795  -1.65  Not  Globalized 
Morocco 0.0109  4.7619  1.09  Globalized 
Oman -0.0103  3.9650  -1.03  Not  Globalized 
Qatar -0.0040  0.7121  -0.40  Not  Globalized 
Saudi Arabia  -0.0176  5.9724  -1.76  Not Globalized 
Sudan -0.0078  0.4909  -0.78  Not  Globalized 
Syria 0.0314  5.3579  3.14  Globalized 
Tunisia 0.0074  2.2993  0.74  Globalized 
UAE 0.0190  5.0617  1.90  Globalized 
Yemen 0.0293  3.1703  2.93  Globalized 
Source: own estimation of a trend equation of the form [Ln x = α + β t] where x is the trade/GDP 
ratio and t is time.  
 
The table shows that, using the World Bank￿s trade measure of globalization, of the eighteen 
Arab countries for which data is available five can be considered as having ￿globalized￿ 
during the current phase of globalization. These are Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, UAE and 
Yemen. Jordan, which was identified by the World Bank as the only ￿globalized￿ Arab 
country, does not make it to the list of ￿globalizers￿ if the period is extended to the year 2000. 
Of the list of Arab ￿globalizers￿ according to the above results two countries are perhaps 
surprising: Syria and Yemen. The other three are obvious candidates for their globalization 
status in view of a number of characteristics, important among which is their pursuit of trade 
liberalization policies during the past two decades.   
A second World Bank￿s measure of globalization is the share of countries in foreign direct 
investment (FDI). This measure can be looked at in terms of the flow of FDI as a ratio of 
GDP or as the sock of the accumulated flows as a percentage of GDP. However, either way it 
is constructed it is not very clear as to what would be considered as a reasonable cut-off point 
for the relevant ratio beyond which a country would be considered as having ￿globalized￿. As 
has already been noted, according to Milanovic (2002) the ratio based of the flows of FDI 
does not seem to be a significant explanatory variable of inequality. In view of this we 
computed the weighted average ratio of the stock of FDI to GDP for the 24 countries 
identified as ￿globalizers￿ by the World Bank (2002) as the benchmark for identifying the 
status of Arab countries. The ratio of the stock of FDI to GDP in 1999 is provided in 
UNCTAD (2001) and the PPP gross national income for 2000 is used as weights. For the 24 
￿globalizers￿ the ratio varied from a high of 65.3% for Malaysia to a low of 1.5% for 
Bangladesh. The simple average ratio is 22.96% with a standard deviation of 16.23 
percentage points while the weighted average is 21.7%.      
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Table (4): FDI Stocks/GDP Ratios in the Arab Countries: 1980-1999 
Country  1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 Globalization  Status 
Algeria  3.1 2.2 2.1 3.3 3.0 Not  Globalized 
Bahrain  2.0  10.8 13.8 43.8 100.0  Globalized 
C o m o r o s        - -  
Djibouti  1.0 1.0 1.3 2.8 6.9 Not  Globlaized 
Egypt 9.9  16.4 25.6 23.9 19.1 Not  Globlaized 
Iraq  - - - - - -- 
Jordan  4.0 9.6 15.3  9.5 19.3  Not  Globalized 
Kuwait  0.1 0.2 0.1 -  1.7 Not  Globalized 
Lebanon  0.5 0.9 1.9 1.2 5.5 Not  Globalized 
Libya  - - - - - -- 
Mauritania  -  5.7 5.6 8.6 10.7  Not  Globalized 
Morocco  1.0 3.4 3.5 9.2 16.0  Not  Globalized 
Oman 8.1  12.0 16.3 16.1 15.7 Not  Globalized 
Qatar  1.1 1.3 0.8 5.7 16.9  Not  Globalized 
Saudi  Arabia  -  25.2 21.5 17.8 20.0 Not  Gloablized 
Somalia  4.8 0.5 -  -  4.3 Not  Globalized 
Sudan  0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 9.7 Not  Globalized 
Syria -  0.2 1.6 1.8 6.5 Not  Globalized 
Tunisia  66.7 83.0 59.0 61.2 57  Globalized 
UAE 1.4 1.8 2.2 4.4 5.3 Not  Globalized 
Yemen  3.7 4.5 3.8 51.0  16.1  Not  Globalized 
Source: UNCTAD (2001: 325, annex table B.6) 
 
Using the weighted average ratio of the stock of FDI to GDP in the World Bank￿s 
￿globalizers￿ as the benchmark for classifying countries it can easily be seen from the table 
that only Bahrain (with a ratio of FDI Stock to GDP of 100%) and Tunisia (with a ratio of 
57%) can be considered as having ￿globalized￿ by the end of 1999. The ratio for the rest of 
the Arab countries is less than 21.7% of GDP, the benchmark ratio for the World Bank 
￿globalizers￿. Saudi Arabia (with a ratio of 20%), Jordan (19.3%) and Egypt (19.1%) are 
border line cases.   
The third World Bank￿s measure of globalization is the number of immigrants to the USA. 
The World Bank (2002: 23) looks at immigrants to the United States by decade from 1870 to 
2000. The measure is defined in flow terms and it is not very clear as to what would be 
considered as reasonable numbers of immigrants beyond which a country would be 
considered as having ￿globalized￿. A possible comparative benchmark would be the average 
number of immigrants sent by the group of ￿globalizers￿.  
Detailed information on immigration to the USA is provided in the US Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (USINS) annual reports.  In its report for the fiscal year 2000 USNIS 
(2000: 11-14 table 3) relevant country information is reported for the period 1990-2000. 
According to USNIS immigrants admitted to the USA in 1990 and 1991 amounted to about 
1.5 and 1.8 millions respectively. The number of immigrants up to the year 2000 fluctuated 
with an overall declining trend where by 2000 about 850 thousand immigrants were admitted 
to the USA.  Using the detailed country information table (5) provides a comparison between 
Arab immigrants, those from the group of ￿globalizers￿ and those from other developing 
regions.      
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Table (5): Immigrants to the USA by Region of Birth: 1990-2000 
Year  Arab Countries  Average per Arab 
Country 
￿Globalizers￿ Average  per 
￿Globalized￿ Country 
All Countries 
1990 23033  1097  965035  40210  1536483 
1991 27070  1289  1280801  53367  1827167 
1992 27884  1329  475101  19796  973977 
1993 28577  1361  417103  17379  904292 
1994 27244  1297  374246  15594  804416 
1995 32837  1564  321674  13403  720461 
1996 36374  1732  436369  18182  915900 
1997 31630  1506  382459  15936  798378 
1998 27677  1318  329464  13728  654451 
1999 26556  1265  334698  13946  646568 
2000 33242  1583  428955  17873  849807 
Source: compiled from USINS (2000: 11-14 table 3). For country details see annex tables (A. 2) and (A.3). 
 
The table clearly shows that immigrants from Arab countries do not constitute a significant 
flow in absolute numbers. Indeed the average number of immigrants for the group of 
￿gobalizers￿ was greater than the total number of Arab immigrants for 1990 and 1991. By the 
year 2000 the average number of immigrants from this group of countries was about 54% of 
the total number of Arab immigrants. In terms of trend, however, the total number of Arab 
immigrants shows an increasing trend. This trend could best be looked at in terms of the 
share of Arab immigrants in the overall total from all countries. From the table it is an easy 
matter to show that this share has increased from about 1.5% in 1990 to about 4.1% in 1999 
and 3.9% in 2000. Be this as it may, and using the average number of immigrants from the 
group of ￿globalizers￿ annex table (A.2) shows that none of the Arab countries has sent more 
than 6186 immigrants (Egypt in 1996) during any year over the period under consideration. 
This is obviously lower than the lowest recorded average number of immigrants (of 13403 in 
1995) sent by the average country from the group of  ￿globalizers￿. Thus on account of this 
measure none of the Arab countries could be considered as having ￿globalized￿ during the 
period 1990-2000. 
The intersection of the set of Arab ￿globalizers￿ on the basis of the rate of growth of the 
trade-GDP ratio and the set of Arab ￿globalizers￿ on the basis of the stock of FDI to GDP 
ratio is Tunisia. This confirms the World Bank￿s result noted above that the Arab region, up 
to the end of the year 2000, seem to have been left out of the current wave of ￿globalization￿. 
 
IV. Inequality in the Arab Countries: 
Using the Gini coefficient, and based on the most recent available high quality data, table (6) 
reports a comparison among world regions. The table, adapted from Deininger and Olinto 
(2002), adopts the standard World Bank classification of world regions. The Middle East and 
North Africa region of the World Bank is represented in the Deininger and Squire (1996) 
high quality data set by six Arab countries. The table summarizes the degree of inequality for 
various regions over five five-year periods (1966-1990) and as such it provides a highly 
aggregated picture. Nonetheless, it will be helpful to compare the Arab region with regions in 
the world in terms of the level and trend of income inequality.    15
 
Table (6): Income Inequality in the Arab Countries and World Regions 1966-1990 (Gini Coefficients in 
percentages) 
Region  Number of  
Countries 
1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 
Arab  Countries  6  43.67 41.65 41.90 42.95 38.17 
East  Asia  and  Pacific  9  37.26 38.89 38.53 38.60 40.04 
Latin  America  17  57.24 50.93 49.77 49.06 50.16 
North  America  2  35.61 35.28 35.91 35.12 36.54 
South  Asia  4  33.30 33.32 35.37 36.68 33.57 
Sub-Saharan Africa  7  39.00  -----  44.00  41.21  35.75 
Western  Europe  15  37.09 34.88 30.82 29.74 30.83 
Sample  60  40.63 39.32 38.51 36.91 38.58 
  Source: Deininger and Olinto (2002: 23, table (1)). 
 
The table shows that the Arab countries, as a group, ranked second to Latin America as the 
highest inequality region for the first two sub-periods as well as for the 1981-85 sub-period. 
During the sub-periods 1976-80 and 1986-90 the region ranked as the third highest inequality 
region. This is reflected in an average Gini coefficient for the distribution of consumption 
expenditure of about 44% compared to one of 57% for Latin America for the first sub-period. 
For the sub-period 1986-90 the Arab region￿s Gini coefficient of about 38% was the third 
highest with East Asia and the Pacific region ranking second highest (with a Gini coefficient 
of about 40%) and Latin America ranking as the highest inequality region (with a Gini 
coefficient of about 50%). We hasten to note that such comparison has to acknowledge the 
fact that for all regions, except Latin America and Western Europe and North America, the 
Gini coefficients are based on consumption expenditure rather than income. In this respect it 
is known that the distribution of expenditure is generally more equal than the distribution of 
income. Indeed Deininger and Squire (1996) advise researchers to upward adjust their 
expenditure based Gini coefficients by 6.6 percentage points to make them comparable to 
those based on income. Making such an adjustment, however, does not change the ranking of 
the regions.  Making the adjustment the Gini coefficient of the distribution of income in the 
Arab countries becomes 50% for the first sub-period and about 45% for the last, which 
reflects a fairly high degree of inequality in the distribution of income
20. 
In terms of inequality trends, the table shows that inequality in the Arab region recorded a 
declining trend with a decrease in the Gini coefficient from about 44% in the first sub-period 
to about 38% in the last sub-period, with a slight increase during the period 1971-1985. 
Declining inequality trends are reported for Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Western 
Europe while increasing inequality trends are reported for East Asia and the Pacific and 
North America. Inequality in South Asia remained virtually the same. Noting that these 
results are based on averages over countries and that the Gini coefficient is not additively 
separable, the above should be interpreted with caution. However, the trend of declining 
inequality for Arab countries is confirmed by detailed official country information.      
                                                 
20 It needs to be cautioned that such average comparisons are sensitive to the countries included in the sample 
and they should only be used as indications. Moreover, due to the fact that the Gini coefficient is not 
additively separable it is very difficult to compare their averages over countries. Alternative methodologies 
compute inequality measures from decile observations from various countries of a given region as will be 
noted below.   16
For six Arab countries for which data is available in Deininger and Squire data base, in 
addition to Yemen for which what can be considered as high quality data has recently been 
published in official sources, table (7) provides the Lorenz reading, in terms of the share of 
various quintiles in consumption expenditure. For each country the information is provided 
for two years: a first year from the late 1980s or early 1990s and a second year from the late 
1990s. Following the standard practice in the literature the first years are taken to represent 
the state of distribution in the early 1990s while the second year is assumed to represent the 
late 1990s. The assumption being invoked is that the distribution of consumption expenditure 
over the relevant period did not change substantially, problematic this assumption as it may 
be especially in the Arab countries. The table also provides the Gini coefficients for the 
distribution of consumption expenditure for each country for the relevant years, as well as the 
annual rate of increase of the Gini coefficients.    
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  Source: Deininger and Squire data base except for Yemen 1998 which is from theYCSO 
(1999), Kuwait which is from KMP (2001) and Oman which is from OMNE 
(2002). 
 
The table shows that in the early 1990s inequality in the distribution of expenditure varied 
among Arab countries. The highest degree of inequality is recorded for Mauritania in 1992 
with an expenditure Gini of about 50% (corresponding to an income Gini of 56.6%). The 
lowest degree of inequality is recorded for Egypt in 1991 with an expenditure Gini of 32% 
(an income Gini of 38.6%). Other high inequality Arab countries include Jordan (with an 
expenditure Gini of about 41%), Yemen (with a Gini of about 40%), Morocco and Algeria 
(39%). In the early 1990s, the average Gini for the high quality sample is 40.06 % with a 
standard deviation of 4.87 percentage points.    17
For all the countries in the sample, except for Morocco, the table shows that inequality has 
declined towards the late 1990s. The highest degree of inequality is recorded for Tunisia in 
1990 (with an expenditure Gini of about 40%, corresponding to an income Gini of 46.6%) 
while the lowest degree of inequality is recorded for Egypt (with an expenditure Gini of 
about 29%). High inequality countries in the late 1990s include Morocco (with an 
expenditure Gini of about 40%) and Mauritania (with an expenditure Gini of about 39%). In 
the late 1990s the average expenditure Gini coefficient for the sample is 36.19% with a 
standard deviation of 4.52 percentage points.    
In terms of the time trend of inequality, the table shows that seven of the eight Arab countries 
recorded a quantitatively important decline in the inequality of the distribution of expenditure 
over relatively short periods of time. The largest decline of 6.5 percentage points in the Gini 
coefficient is recorded for Mauritania over a period of six years. The annual rate of decline of 
the Gini coefficient of Mauritania is 2.8 per cent. The second largest absolute decline is 
recorded for Yemen (5.22 percentage points) over a period of six years thus resulting in an 
annual rate of decline of 2.34 per cent, while the third highest absolute decline is that for 
Egypt (3.01 percentage points). Morocco is the only country that recorded an increase in 
inequality of 0.62 percentage points, but the increase is not quantitatively significant being at 
an annual rate of 0.22%.  
Thus, contrary to the results by Li, Squire and Zou (1998) the distribution of expenditure in 
the Arab region tends to show quantitatively significant changes over fairly short periods of 
time. This declining trend is in conformity with the results of Squire and Olinto (2002) 
summarized in table (4). However, the recorded declining trend in inequality does not seem 
to accord with an intuitive understanding of the economic and social changes that have been 
taking place in most of the Arab countries in the sample. Given the short periods of time over 
which the above changes in the distribution of expenditure have occurred, and given the fact 
that the underlying structural factors affecting inequality are not likely to have undergone 
drastic changes over the same period, it is open to empirical investigation as to what might 
have caused such changes. One possible hypothesis worthy of testing is that perhaps changes 
in macroeconomic policy may be the cause. Almost all of these countries have experienced 
such macro policy changes during the indicated time periods. However, the precise ways in 
which macro policy changes affect income inequality are not theoretically well known, 
though the design and content, of most policy packages would suggest that their influence 
would be to worsen the state of expenditure distribution.  An important component of these 
macroeconomic policy packages is that of trade policies designed to increase the degree of 
openness of these countries to the global market
21.  
An alternative hypothesis would be that the household surveys on the basis of which these 
Gini coefficients are calculated somehow fail to capture the top expenditure groups that have 
emerged following the implementation of the policy packages. A case in point is that of 
Egypt. Thus, for example, Datt, Jolliffe and Sharma (1998: 16 table 3) report a Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of consumption expenditure of  35% for 1997. Their result is 
based on Egypt Integrated Household Survey, which is a nationally representative household 
survey that collected information on household composition, income, consumption and 
several other characteristics. Thus, on the basis of these results income inequality in Egypt 
could be seen to have increased by an annual rate of growth of 9.9% since 1995 or 1.5% since 
1991. Such a result would conform to casual observations of the state of distribution in 
Egypt.  
                                                 
21 For a possible explanation of the declining trend see Page and van  Gelder (2002).   18
To properly assess the effect of globalization on inequality in the Arab region we follow the 
recent literature and generate an income distribution profile for the region as a whole utilizing 
the income distribution information available at the country level (see, for example, 
Milanovic (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2002)). As noted earlier the construction of a regional 
distribution based on country information attempts the assignments of per capita incomes to 
the various income classes on the assumption that within each income class there is an even 
distribution. Using the standard Lorenz curve relationship between the share of the bottom p
th 
percent of the population and the overall average income in a given country such assignment 
of incomes can be undertaken. Recall that the share of the bottom p
th percent of the 
population, L(p), is given by the Lorenz relationship:  
 (1)    L(p) = p [￿p/￿]  
where ￿ is the overall mean income and ￿p is the mean income of the bottom p
th percentage 
of the population and p varies from zero to unity. The results for all countries can then be 
arrayed in terms of per capita incomes in an ascending order.  
The above approach was applied to the six high quality data sample in addition to Yemen 
(representing about 57% of the population of the Arab region in 1998). For the early 1990s 
and late 1990s periods 35 per capita income groups were generated. The early 1990s per 
capita incomes in the sample of Arab countries ranged from a low per capita income of US$ 
94 to a high of US$ 4769 with a mean of US$1981; while for the late 1990s period the range 
is from US$218 to US$4797with a mean of US$ 1917. On the basis of these groups the 
following quintile distributions of income were generated and the Gini coefficients were 
calculated. 
 
Table (8) : The Distribution of Income in the Arab Region: High Quality Data 
Quintile  Expenditure Share in Early 1990s (%)  Expenditure Share in Late 1990s (%) 
First Quintile  5.8  6.1 
Second Quintile  11.2  11.7 
Third Quintile  18.6  18.7 
Fourth Quintile  27.0  26.7 
Fifth Quintile  37.3  36.8 
Gini Coefficient  32.74  31.77 
  Source: own calculations based on table (7). 
 
As would have been expected from the discussion of the state of inequality in various Arab 
countries in the previous section, where countries posted a decline in the Gini coefficient 
between the first and second years, the above table shows that for the high quality sample of 
Arab countries inequality in the distribution of consumption expenditure has declined during 
the 1990s as indicated by a decease in the Gini coefficient from 32.7% in the early 1990s to 
31.8% in the late 1990s. Of the seven countries in the Arab high quality sample Tunisia, 
Morocco and Yemen have been identified as having globalized according to the World 
Bank￿s trade measure of globalization.  
In an attempt to capture the diversity of the Arab countries alluded to in section (3) above we 
augmented the high quality sample with two countries for which distribution data is available   19
the quality of which, however, has not been assessed. These are Kuwait, for which data is 
available for 1987 and 1996, and Sudan, for which data is available for 1987 and 1999. For 
the early 1990s period 66 per capita consumption groups were generated which ranged from a 
low of US$37 to a high of US$ 21682 with an overall mean of US$ 2110. For the late 1990s 
period 63 per capita consumption groups were generated which ranged from a low of US$71 
to a high of US$ 18535 with an overall mean of US$2237. The resulting distributions are 
reported in table (9). 
 
Table (9): The Distribution of Income in the Arab Region: Expanded Sample 
Quintile  Expenditure Share in Early 
1990s (%) 
Expenditure Share in Late 
1990s (%) 
First Quintile  5.12  4.47 
Second Quintile  12.27  10.65 
Third Quintile  17.58  16.08 
Fourth Quintile  23.96  22.95 
Fifth Quintile  41.08  45.85 
Gini Coefficient  33.43  38.02 
   Source: own calculations. 
 
The results of the expanded sample show that inequality in the Arab region has increased during the 
1990s as reflected in an increase in the Gini coefficient from 32.2% in the early 1990s to about 40% 
in the late 1990s. The number of Arab ￿globalizers￿ in the sample has not increased as a result of 
expanding the sample but their share in total population and income has declined. Comparing the 
results of tables (8) and (9) indicates the sensitivity of the results to the sample composition and as 
such does not provide conclusive evidence as to the effect of ￿globalization￿ on inequality in the 
region.  
 
V.   The Effect of Globalization on Inequality: 
V.I. The Indirect Effect Revisited:  
As noted in section (2) the most celebrated empirical result on the effect of globalization on 
inequality is that of Dollar and Kraay (2000-a and b). Recall that the link between 
￿globalization￿ and inequality was obtained in an indirect fashion by first establishing that 
the average income of the poorest 20% of the population has a unitary elasticity with respect 
to the overall average income (a relationship which is true by definition) and then by noting 
that trade intensity measure is positively associated with growth in per capita income in the 
empirical growth literature. As noted above DK (2000-a: 33) conclude ￿we have found little 
evidence of a systematic effect of trade volumes on income inequality. Combining this 
observation with the results on the growth benefits of greater trade, we conclude that the 
balance of the evidence suggests that, on average, greater globalization is a force for poverty 
reduction￿. In the context of the DK definition of the poor the policy message of the DK￿s 
conclusion should be read as saying that ￿on average, greater globalization is a force for 
reducing inequality￿.  
Ali and Elbadawi (2001) presented an alternative set of results on the relationship between 
the average income of the poor and overall average income where the poor are properly   20
defined as those falling below an appropriately defined poverty line instead of the bottom 
20% of the population. In this regard it should be noted that the average income of the poor 
could be derived from the relationship between the head-count measure and the poverty-gap 
measure
22. On the basis of this definition of the average income of the poor and overall 
average income it can be shown that the elasticity of the average income of the poor and 
overall average income in not in general proportional and depends on three components:  the 
income elasticity of the head-count ratio (call it EH); the income elasticity of the poverty-gap 
ratio (call it EPG); and the income elasticity of the poverty line (call it Ez). Indeed Ali and 
Elbadawi show that the elasticity of the average income of the poor with respect to overall 
average income (call Eyp) is given by : 
 (2)   Eyp = Ez + (1 ￿ Ez)(1 ￿ EH/EPG) 
Note that if the poverty line is assumed constant across countries, and possibly over  time as 
the tradition in the World Bank deems appropriate, Ez will be zero and the elasticity of the 
average income of the poor with respect to overall average income will depend on the 
magnitude of the income elaticities of the poverty measures and that in general it is not equal 
to unity
23. For a sample of 48 developing countries, including the six Arab countries, for 
which high quality data is available, the average income of the poor is calculated in a direct 
fashion. The results are summarized in table (10) where standard deviations are reported in 
brackets.  
 
Table (10): The Average Income of the Poor in a Sample of Developing Countries: A Summary 
Detail  Arab Countries  Sub-Saharan Africa  Asia  Latin America  All Countries 
Number of 
Countries 









































































Source: Ali an Elbadawi (2001: 6 table (1)).    
                                                 
22 Note that the head-cunt measure of poverty is given by H = q/n, where q is the number of people with 
incomes below the poverty line, z. The poverty gap measure of poverty PG = H (1 ￿ yp/z), where yp is the 
average income of the poor. Therefore, the average income of the poor,  yp = z (1 ￿ PG/H). Thus the 
average income of the poor can be calculated once information on the head-count, the poverty-gap and the 
poverty line is available. This, of course, requires calculating the poverty measures.  
 
23 Note that a necessary and sufficient condition for Eyp to equal unity is that Ez is equal to unity which will 
obtain if the poverty line is assumed to be a constant proportion of overall average income. If such an 
assumption is made it can be shown that all poverty measures that are homogeneous of degree zero in mean 
income and the poverty line will be functions of the degree of inequality in the distribution of income. This 
automatically implies that EH will be zero. Moreover, note that if Ez is assumed to be zero equation  (2) in 
the text collapses to that derived by Kakwani (1980).     21
 
We note in passing that the table shows that the head-count ratio varies among countries in a 
given region, as well as for the whole sample, as clearly indicated by the reported standard 
deviations. Thus, the major assumption used by Dollar and Kraay (2001-b) of looking at the 
mean income of the bottom 20% of the population as representing that of the poor has 
nothing to do with measured poverty.  
On the basis of detailed calculations of the magnitudes involved in equation (2) Ali and 
Elbadawi  (2001) provide average results for the elasticity with respect to mean income of the 
head-count ratio, EH, the poverty-gap ratio, EPG and the poverty line, Ez   as well as estimates 
for the elasticity of the mean income of the poor with respect to mean income, Eyp . A 
summary of these results is presented in table (11).  
 
Table (11): The Elasticity of the Mean Income of the Poor with Respect to Mean Income in a Sample of 



















of the Average 
Income of the 
Poor (Eyp)  
Arab 
Countries 
-2.29 -3.20  0.77  0.29  0.45 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
-0.98 -1.43  0.68  0.19  0.46 
Asia -2.44  -3.42  0.77  0.25  0.43 
Latin America  -1.17  -1.52  0.79  0.39  0.51 
Sample 
Countries 
-1.45 -2.01  0.74  0.26  0.47 
Source: Ali and Elbadawi (2001: 7, table (2)).  
 
The last column is the relevant set of calculations for testing whether there exists one-for-one 
effect of the increase in the mean income of society on the mean income of the poor (along 
the lines of the Dollar-Kraay findings). According to these results the highest response is 
recorded for Latin America where a one percent increase in the overall average income will 
be expected to increase the mean income of the poor by 0.51 percentage points. The lowest 
response is reported for the Asian group of countries where the mean income of the poor 
increases by 0.43 of the percentage increase in the mean income of society. For the whole 
sample the increase in mean income of the poor is slightly lower than half, 0.47, of the 
percentage increase in the mean income of society. At this level of analysis, therefore, there is 
no evidence to support a strict one-to-one proportionality, given the proper definition of the 
average income of the poor
24. These results, it is suggested, are more in line with an intuitive 
understanding of what was happening to the poor during economic growth episodes than the 
                                                 
24 On the basis of detailed country calculations these results a t-test was performed for regions and for the 
whole sample where it is found that for all regions except Sub-Saharan Africa the income elasticity of the 
average income of the poor is not significantly different from 0.5. The income elasticity of the poor in Sub-
Saharan is significantly lower than 0.5.  
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claim that the ￿income of the poor rises one-for-one with overall growth￿
25. The results for 
the six Arab countries are reported in table (12). 
 























Income of the 
Poor (Eyp)  
Algeria -  2.67  -3.00  0.89  0.305  0.38 
Egypt  - 3.54  - 5.67  0.62  0.239  0.53 
Jordan  -2.28 -3.51 0.65  0.348 0.58 
Mauritania  -1.26 -1.13 1.11  0.  145  0.05 
Morocco  -2.13 -3.29 0.65  0.289 0.54 
Tunisia  -1.86 -2.60 0.72  0.430 0.59 
  Mean  -2.29 -3.20 0.77  0.290 0.45 
  S.D.  0.77 1.48 0.19 0.100  0.21 
Source: Ali and Elbadawi (2001: 15, appendix table (A. 2)). 
 
The table shows that for the Arab countries the highest response of the income of the poor to 
an increase in overall average income is recorded for Tunisia, followed by Jordan, Morocco 
and Egypt. The lowest response is recorded for Mauritania. The overall mean elasticity for 
the Arab countries is 0.45, which is not statistically different from 0.5 as noted above. Thus in 
the Arab countries the spill over from the positive growth effect of trade to the poor is not to 
increase their average income one-for-one as claimed by DK but rather by only 50% of the 
increase in per capita income.    
In addition to the above direct calculations of the elasticity of the average income of the poor 
with respect to overall average income Ali and Elbadawi (2001) also conducted a regression 
test for the proportionality hypothesis. In addition to the original DK (2000-b) specification, 
where the logarithm of the mean income of the poor is regressed against the logarithm of the 
overall average income, quadratic formats in the level and log of overall average income 
were run to allow the elasticity in question to vary according to the level of development as 
reflected by the overall average income. In view of the observed significant difference of 
Sub-Saharan Africa a dummy for this region was introduced. The results are summarized in 
table (13), where figures between brackets are adjusted White￿s heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors
26.   
 
                                                 
25 For similar results see Foster and Szekely (2001) who use the concept of general means to track low 
incomes. The authors specifically acknowledge that it is the difficulty of computing appropriately defined 
average income of the poor, using poverty lines for a large number of countries, and the arbitrariness of 
poverty lines, that prompted them to use the concept of general means to track low incomes. Their overall 
conclusion  is that ￿living standards at the bottom of the distribution improve with growth, but that the poor 
gain proportionately much less than the average individual￿ (Foster and Szekely (2001: 17). 
26 Dollar and Kraay argue that simple OLS could result in inconsistent parameter estimates for at least three 
reasons: measurement errors, omitted variables bias or endogeneity due to feedback from mean income of 
the poor to society￿s mean income.  For other purposes these econometric issues can be investigated. For 
our purposes the results should be taken as possible confirmation to the direct calculations reported above.   23





DK Specification  Quadratic  in 
Levels 
Quadratic in Logs 
Average Income      0.0073 (0.0014)   
Squared Average 
Income 





0.6937 (0.0937)  0.6929 
(0.0955) 
 -0.892  (0.467) 
Squared Ln 
Average Income 
   0.1633  (0.059) 
SSA Dummy    -0.0058 
(0.1858) 
-0.1644 (0.058)  -0.1453 (0.059) 
Constant 1.342  (0.368)  1.3472 
(0.4127) 
2.749 (0.1005)  4.07 
(1.069) 
R-Squared 0.5354  0.5354  0.899  0.901 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.5253 0.51477  0.892  0.894 
Source: Ali and Elbadawi (2001: 10, table (6)). 
 
The table reports a set of interesting results. Results in the first column correspond to that of 
Dollar and Kraay and provide a direct estimate of the elasticity of the mean income of the 
poor with respect to mean income of society. According to the result the elasticity of the 
average income of the poor is about 0.69, and is significantly different from unity with a t-
value of 3.27. The results for the quadratic in levels and in logs show that the curvature term 
in mean income is highly significant (at better than 5% level of significance) which suggests 
that in general the income elasticity of the average income of the poor should be expected to 
vary between countries depending on the state of development as captured by overall average 
income.  
On the basis of the results for the quadratic specifications the income elasticity of the average 
income of the poor with respect to overall average income can be calculated for various 
countries and groups of countries. Thus, for example, the calculations show that, for the 
whole sample the mean income elasticity of the average income of the poor is 0.58 (with a 
standard deviation of 0.25) for the quadratic in levels and 0.59 (with a standard deviation of 
0.23) for the quadratic in logs.  For the quadratic in levels the mean elasticity varied from a 
low of 0.40 for Sub-Saharan Africa to a high of 0.76 for Latin America and for the quadratic 
in logs the range of the mean elasticity is from a low of 0.43 for Sub-Saharan Africa to a high 
of 0.76 for Latin America. For the six Arab countries the results are reported in table (14).  
 
Table (14): Income Elasticity of the Average Income of the Poor in Arab Countries 
Country  Quadratic in Levels  Quadratic in Logs 
Algeria 0.67  0.67 
Egypt 0.54  0.57 
Jordan 0.75  0.72 
Mauritania 0.34  0.39 
Morocco 0.64  0.65 
Tunisia 0.87  0.81 
Mean (S.D.)  0.63 (0.18)  0.63 (0.14) 
Source: Ali and Elbadawi (2001: 16 appendix table (A.3)). 
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The results for the Arab countries are similar to those for other regions and the whole sample 
in the sense that the mean elasticity is identical under the two specifications.  For the Arab 
countries, and from the information provided in the table, it is an easy matter to show that the 
regional elasticities are significantly different from unity. For the elasticity based on the 
quadratic in levels the t-value is 5.04; while for the quadratic in logs the t-value is 6.47.  The 
highest response of the average income of the poor to changes in overall average income is 
recorded for Tunisia, followed by Jordan, Algeria and Morocco. The lowest response is 
recorded for Mauritania. These results confirm the earlier results based on direct calculations 
and more importantly caution against using constant elasticities in general. Thus, on average, 
the growth effects of ￿globalization￿, in the sense of possible increases in per capita income, 
will be expected to benefit the Arab poor only to the extent of about 63% of the percentage 
increase in per capita income rather than the claimed one-to-one effect.     
 
V.2. Direct Effects:  
As noted in section (2) direct effects of globalization on inequality can be captured by 
regressing various inequality measures as dependent variables on measures of 
￿globalization￿, or measures of openness as proxy for ￿globalization￿. Utilizing DK (2000-b) 
data set we are able to identify a sample of 51 countries for which we could calculate the 
average income of the poor as was done by Ali and Elbadawi (2001). In their data set DK 
provide the following measures of ￿openness￿: (a) exports plus imports as a share of GDP in 
PPP. The variable is taken as the average for five years up to and including the year of the 
survey. This variable is denoted as OPENAV; (b) adjusted OPENADJAV which is based on 
the residuals from pooled ordinary least squares regression of OPENAV on Frankel-Romer 
instrument and the logarithm of population in 1990
27; (c) Sachs and Warner openness 
dummy, denoted SWAV, and defined as the average over five years up to and including the 
year of the survey; and, (d) a dummy variable for the membership (=1) of WTO or GATT, 
denoted as WTOAV, and defined as the average over five years up to and including the year 
of the survey
28. The results are reported in table (15) where figures in brackets are White 





                                                 
27 Frankel and Romer (1999), in the context of exploring the role of trade in explaining growth, regressed 
bilateral trade flows as a share of GDP on measures of country mass, distance between trade partners, and a 
few other geographical variables and then constructed a predicted aggregate trade share for each country 
using the estimated coefficients.     
28 Other measures of openness in the DK data set include (i) capital account restriction, denoted KARESTAV; 
and, (ii) import taxes as a share of imports, denoted IMPTAXAV. These were not used because they will 
reduce the size of the sample for which we can calculate poverty measures and hence the average income of 
the poor. 
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Table (15): Openness and the Average Income of the Poor 
(dependent variable is the logarithm of the average income of the poor) 
Independent 































   0.1459 
(0.80) 
   
OPENADJAV   0.1800 
(0.78) 
   0.1859 
(0.95) 
  
SWAV     0.0112 
(0.13) 
   0.0024 
(0.04) 
 
WTOAV    0.0887 
(1.13) 


















#  Observations  49  49 47 51 49 49 47 51 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.8084  0.8116 0.8173 0.8289 0.8784 0.8802 0.8823 0.8872 
 
The above, it is suggested, are interesting results. Columns I-IV in the table report results on 
the basis of the original DK specification for the various measures of openness. It should be 
noted that in the above results the income elasticity of the average income of the poor is les 
than unity as Ali and Elbadawi (2001) have argued. As for the effect of openness on the 
average income of the poor it is clear that none of the openness indicators has a statistically 
significant effect on the average income of the poor. The trade intensity measure has a 
negative effect in the sense that controlling for the overall income level it is expected that an 
increase in trade volumes as a ratio of GDP will reduce the average income of the poor. For 
the other three measures there is a positive relationship to be appropriately interpreted.  
Columns V-VIII in the table report the results of the effect of openness measures on the 
average income of the poor for the quadratic format that allows the elasticity of the average 
income of the poor with respect to overall average income to vary with the level of 
development as captured by per capita GDP. An interesting result to note is that there seems 
to exist a Kuznets process in the sense that at early stages of development the average income 
of the poor seems to decline before it increases. This is captured by the negative and 
significant coefficient of the logarithm of average and the positive and significant coefficient 
of the squared logarithm. This means that as per capita income increases the average income 
of the poor tends to decline first before it increases. As for the effect of the various measures 
of openness on the average income of the poor the results for the original DK specification 
obtain for the quadratic form. None of the measures is significantly related to the average 
income of the poor.  
The above two sets of results confirm the results reported by DK regarding the effect of 
openness on the average income of the poor where the poor are defined as the poorest 20% of 
the population. To the extent that these various measures of openness can be taken to reflect 
the status of globalization of countries then it can be concluded that perhaps the poor will not 
be affected by ￿globalization￿. More direct results, however, would require the use of a more 
direct measure of globalization.  
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To apply the direct measures of globalization a new sample of 58 countries for which Gini 
coefficients are available for the 1990s is chosen from DK￿s data set. A test of the effect of 
globalization on inequality is performed by regressing the Gini coefficient on the World 
Bank￿s measures of globalization, namely the rate of increase of the trade intensity ratio over 
the period 1980-2000 (TGR); the stock of FDI as a ratio of GDP in 1999 (FDI); and, the 
logarithm of the average annual number of immigrants to the US, where the average is taken 
over the period 1990-2000 (LIM). In all regressions a dummy (DUM) for Arab countries is 
introduced. The Arab countries in the sample are Algeria (for which the Gini coefficient is 
reported for 1995), Egypt (1991), Jordan (1997), Mauritania (1993),  Morocco (1990), 
Tunisia (1990) and Yemen (1992). The assumption being made regarding inequality is the 
usual one used in the literature where a Gini observation for a 1990s year is taken to represent 
inequality during the decade. The Gini coefficient and its logarithm are used as dependent 
variables. The qualitative results, as well as the explanatory powers, of the two formats are 
similar and as such only the results for the logarithm of the Gini are reported in table (16) 
where the absolute values of the White heteroscedastic consistent t-values are between 
brackets.  
 
Table (16): Globalization and Inequality in Developing Countries 
(dependant variable= logarithm of the Gini coefficient) 










































































Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the usual 10, 5 and 1 percent levels. 
 
The table shows the expected direction of qualitative effect of each globalization measure on 
its own as well when all measures are considered together. In all the results the dummy for 
Arab countries is negative and significant indicating that in the 1990s income inequality in 
the Arab countries was on average lower than that prevailing in the developing countries of 
the sample.  The results show that increased participation in world trade as reflected by the 
growth rate of the trade intensity measure is likely to reduce inequality in developing 
countries in a statistically significant, fashion. A one percent increase in the rate of growth of 
trade intensity is expected to reduce the Gini index by 0.01 percent. On its own increased 
trade explains about 9 percent of the observed variation in inequality in developing countries. 
Globalization as captured by immigration to the US is also expected to reduce inequality in   27
the developing countries in a statistically significant fashion. An increase in the average 
number of immigrants per country per year by one percent is expected to reduce the Gini 
coefficient by 0.03 percent. On its own immigration to the USA explains about 9 percent of 
the observed variation in inequality. In contrast to the effect of these two globalization 
measures, an increase in the ratio of the stock of foreign direct investment to GDP is expected 
to increase inequality in a statistically significant fashion, but the effect is rather small. A 
percentage point increase in the FDI/GDP ratio increases the Gini coefficient by 0.001 
percent. On its own the FDI variable explains 15 percent of the variation in inequality. 
In all the remaining results the trade intensity variable loses its statistical significance and the 
two other globalization measures keep theirs as well as the qualitative direction, and the 
quantitative magnitude, of their effect. The FDI and immigration variables together explain 
about 16 percent of the variation in inequality in developing countries, while the three 
globalization measures explain about 15 percent. Either way these seem to be reasonable 
results in view of the known structural, and policy, variables affecting inequality in various 
economies.     
 
VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks: 
The most important results of this paper could be summarized as follows:  
(a) that the Arab region, diverse and oil rich as it may be, has so far been left out of the 
third globalization wave of the 1980s to the present. At best, using the growth rate of 
trade to GDP ratio over the period 1980 to the present as the indicator of 
globalization, only five Arab countries could be considered as having ￿globalized￿. 
These countries are Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen. The only Arab 
country identified by the World Bank as having ￿globalized￿, Jordan, does not belong 
to this set of Arab ￿globalizers￿. This suggests that the identification of countries on 
the globalization scale is sensitive to the period over which globalization measures are 
constructed. Using the FDI stock as a ratio of GDP measure of globalization only two 
Arab countries can be considered as having ￿globalized￿ by the end of 1999. These 
countries are Bahrain and Tunisia. At the other extreme, using the immigration to the 
US measure of globalization albeit in a heuristic fashion, none of the Arab countries 
could be considered as having ￿globalized￿ as yet;  
(b) that despite the problems involved in getting high quality data on income, or 
expenditure, distribution there is evidence to show that the Arab region boasts a fairly 
high degree of income inequality. The time trend of the degree of inequality, however, 
is subject to debate. Official data show inequality to have declined over the 1990s 
decade. Given the fact that the Arab region has so far been left out of the third 
globalization wave, it is not clear as to whether globalization is responsible for this 
declining trend in inequality in the Arab region;    
(c) that like in many other developing countries the Arab poor, appropriately defined, 
stand to benefit from trade induced economic growth by about  50 percent of the 
increase in per capita income. This is contrary to the celebrated result that purports to 
promise the poor a one-to-one increase in their income as a result of ￿globalization￿ 
induced increase in per capita incomes;    28
 
 
(d) that there exists preliminary evidence of a direct causal link between globalization as 
measured by FDI/GDP ratio and immigration to the USA in such a way that FDI 
increases inequality while immigration reduces it. 
The above tentative results should be looked at as calling for increased research efforts that 
need to be made to ascertain the possible effects of ￿globalization￿ on various aspects of the 
social dimensions in developing countries. Inequality in the distribution of the fruits of 
economic growth is an important aggregator of the social dimension that is likely to have 
serious implications for political stability with an obvious corollary for macroeconomic 
stability. In this respect strong policy advocacy messages of the form that globalization 
induced economic ￿growth is good for the poor￿ are not likely to helpful to policy makers in 
developing countries, including Arab countries. As rightly noted by Rodrik (2001: 2) world 
￿markets are a source of technology and capital; it would be silly for the developing world 
not to exploit these opportunities. But globalization is not a short cut to development. Policy 
makers need to forge a domestic growth strategy, relying on domestic investors and domestic 
institutions￿. It is in the context of such  growth and development strategies that distributional 
conflicts that may arise from deeper integration in world markets can be resolved.    29
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Annex  table (A. 1): Trade GDP Ratio in the Arab Countries 1980-2000 
Year Algeria Bahrain Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar 
Saudi 
Arabia Syrian Tunisia UAE Yemen  Comoros Sudan Mauritania
1980  64.68 239.35  73.38  124.05  112.65 118.70  97.59 45.27 100.31 85.99  101.02 54.76 85.84  112.41  45.88  60.64 33.73 103.48 
1981  65.46 251.14  82.18  140.18  107.98 116.06  91.18 54.92 102.78 79.74  103.42 49.60 91.21  103.20  43.27  60.97 33.27 120.01 
1982  59.92 225.76  68.97  130.85  106.87 121.03  87.03 52.96 101.70 108.82 96.50  39.64 84.35 98.99 62.84  69.53 34.35 124.77 
1983  53.74 189.63  61.91  114.44  108.48 116.16 80.48 51.56  91.72 96.97  102.66 40.74 77.08 95.70 49.46  73.51  31.84 122.04 
1984 53.18 190.33  58.16  114.33  104.75 134.34 41.64  58.25  87.86 82.39 95.67 37.17 77.29 90.82 48.37  64.55  24.93 118.72 
1985 50.33 191.61  51.96  113.07 96.42  113.59 39.37  59.69  87.01 76.08 79.97 37.99 70.24 89.65 52.58  67.06  17.63 140.70 
1986 36.03 183.52  41.33  84.75 94.20  92.43 33.82  50.34  80.17 75.57 74.23 34.19 67.49 87.13 48.15  57.93  12.96 135.47 
1987 32.68 189.77  35.32  93.99 89.66  70.05 29.99  51.63  77.94 58.35 79.22 45.51 70.64 94.23 36.47  57.75  16.66 115.67 
1988 38.11 172.83  52.48  112.19 90.50  82.03 28.00  52.32  78.64 55.71 76.27 43.65 83.68 98.44 30.96  59.76  15.79 113.30 
1989 47.15 186.27  50.24  133.38 93.77  109.94 55.69  52.66  78.79 62.64 75.40 54.39 92.01 103.75 30.63  54.17  27.42 106.57 
1990 48.38 210.16  52.76  154.65  103.01 117.92 63.43  58.88  83.34 72.49 82.35 56.29 94.16 105.80 34.35  51.40  27.66 106.37 
1991 52.72 180.64  63.61  142.21  142.61 97.43 50.29  53.87  86.95 71.63 85.99 56.48 85.69 113.77 49.32  58.22  22.33 96.35 
1992 49.19 181.12  60.86  131.42 94.69  87.24 40.48  56.86  88.85 76.59 84.47 63.89 86.00 122.70 46.16  59.89  19.88 89.65 
1993 44.92 164.60  58.39  130.27 92.06  80.48 45.10  58.13  91.04 71.77 77.57 68.77 88.41 124.53 56.45  57.68  19.77 103.48 
1994 51.49 155.18  51.08  118.20 93.18  74.05 51.39  55.79  89.20 78.65 68.80 78.45 92.73 131.33 47.71  67.56  19.99 87.72 
1995 57.90 152.46  49.95  123.05 96.57  77.11 50.55  61.50  74.72 87.67 74.28 68.98 93.38 133.83 64.13  64.33  17.06 108.63 
1996 54.12 164.12  46.14  129.20 92.71  69.34 48.08  55.93  78.00 83.51 76.48 69.91 85.78 147.00 79.24  59.70  27.96 103.03 
1997 52.86 148.58  45.38  119.59 93.94  59.84 43.41  60.26  79.92 71.98 76.50 66.22 89.98 132.44 73.94  61.17  21.17 88.14 
1998 47.35 128.49  42.63  108.53 96.98  55.04 38.41  59.74  79.43 81.78 66.18 61.42 89.29 130.04 70.20  59.28  24.95 93.62 
1999 52.17 136.01  38.84  105.58 86.26  49.07 41.89  64.02  76.19 79.64 67.79 64.13 86.64 131.00 78.95  58.29  23.28 87.77 
2000 64.32 145.37  38.87  110.96 88.40  50.76 42.97  68.58  81.41 77.80 75.29 72.60 91.58 113.70 91.90  57.52  32.98 97.93 
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Annex table (A.2): Arab Immigrants to the USA 1990-2000 
Country  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Algeria          302           269          407           360          364          650      1,059           717  804  789  907 
Bahrain            58             58            81             93            87            78            76            80  53  70  106 
Comoros                    2               3              1              2              3              3        3 
Djibouti            22             21            14             14            10            25            19            18  15  6  14 
Egypt      4,117       5,602       3,576       3,556       3,392       5,648       6,186       5,031   4,831  4,429  4,461 
Iraq      1,756       1,494       4,111       4,072       6,025       5,596       5,481       3,244   2,220  3,372  5,134 
Jordan      4,449       4,259       4,036       4,741       3,990       3,649       4,445       4,171   3,255  3,274  3,909 
Kuwait          691           861          989       1,129       1,065           961      1,202           837  749  803  1,018 
Lebanon      5,634       6,009       5,838       5,465       4,319       3,884       4,382       3,568   3,290  3,040  3,674 
Libya          268           314          286           343          166          216          250          171  166  156  181 
Mauritania              3               9              2               9            10            22            26            51  78  24  88 
Morocco      1,200       1,601       1,316       1,176       1,074       1,726       1,783       2,359   2,410  2,971  3,626 
Oman              9               5            24             21            32            31            25            36  25  40  51 
Qatar            33             56            59             88            51            60            79            70  60  78  97 
Saudi Arabia          518           552          584           616          668          788      1,164           815  703  763  1,063 
Somalia          277           458          500       1,088       1,737       3,487       2,170       4,005   2,629  1,710  2,465 
Sudan          306           679          675           714          651      1,645       2,172       2,030   1,161  1,354  1,538 
Syria      2,972       2,837       2,940       2,933       2,426       2,362       3,072       2,269   2,840  2,056  2,374 
Tunisia          226           275          216           167          149          189          228          163  200  150  308 
UAE          192           164          172           196          286          317          343          329  329  310  436 
Yemen         1,547       2,056       1,793           741      1,501       2,209       1,663   1,859  1,161  1,789 
Total    23,033     27,070     27,884     28,577     27,244     32,837     36,374     31,630     27,677     26,556     33,242  
Source: USNIS (2000: table (3)). 
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Annex table (A. 3) : Immigration to the US from the World Bank￿s Globalized Developing Countries 
Country  1990 1991  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Hungary        1,655           1,534        1,304         1,091           880           900        1,183           949   809  698  1,025 
Bangladesh        4,252         10,676        3,740         3,291        3,434        6,072        8,221        8,681   8,621  6,046  7,215 
China, R.      31,815         33,025      38,907       65,578      53,985      35,463      41,728      41,147   36,884  32,204  45,652 
India      30,667         45,064      36,755       40,121      34,921      34,748      44,859      38,071   36,482  30,237  42,046 
Jordan        4,449           4,259        4,036         4,741        3,990        3,649        4,445        4,171   3,255  3,274  3,909 
Malaysia        1,867           1,860        2,235         2,026        1,480        1,223        1,414        1,051   1,011  994  1,556 
Nepal           184              174           212            257           257           312           431           447   476  453  617 
Philippines      63,756         63,596      61,022       63,457      53,535      50,984      55,876      49,117   34,466  31,026  42,474 
Thailand        8,914           7,397        7,090         6,654        5,489        5,136        4,310        3,094   3,102  2,381  3,785 
Cote d’Ivoire           184              347           259            250           268           289           432           430   364  305 439 
Mali             34                63             55              51             55             94           124             97   83  72  109 
Rwanda               6                12             10              25             16             41           118           170   52  98 73 
Zimbabwe           272              261           296            308           246           299           385           274   186  184  323 
Mexico    679,068       946,167    213,802     126,561    111,398      89,932    163,572    146,865   131,575  147,573  173,919 
Dominican R.      42,195         41,405      41,969       45,420      51,189      38,512      39,604      27,053   20,387  17,864  17,536 
Haiti      20,324         47,527      11,002       10,094      13,333      14,021      18,386      15,057   13,449  16,532  22,364 
Jamaica      25,013         23,828      18,915       17,241      14,349      16,398      19,089      17,840   15,146  14,733  16,000 
Costa Rica        2,840           2,341        1,480         1,368        1,205        1,062        1,504        1,330   1,204  886  1,324 
Nicaragua      11,562         17,842        8,949         7,086        5,255        4,408        6,903        6,331   3,521  13,389  24,029 
Argentina        5,437           3,889        3,877         2,824        2,318        1,762        2,456        1,964   1,511  1,393  2,331 
Brazil        4,191           8,133        4,755         4,604        4,491        4,558        5,891        4,583   4,401  3,902  6,959 
Colombia      24,189         19,702      13,201       12,819      10,847      10,838      14,283      13,004   11,836  9,966  14,498 
Paraguay           704              538           514            668           789           559           615           304   275  217  342 
Uruguay        1,457           1,161           716            568           516           414           540           429   368  271  430 
Total    965,035    1,280,801    475,101     417,103    374,246    321,674    436,369    382,459     329,464     334,698    428,955 
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Annex  table (A.4) :  Average Income of the Poor in a Sample of Developing Countries: Ali  and  Elbadawi Sample 
 Country  Year  Average  Income 
(US$ per person 
per month) 
Poverty Line 
(US$ per person 
per month) 
Head-count 





Average Income of the 





1   Algeria   1988  118.00  50.4  16.9  4.21  37.82  39.3 
2   Egypt   1991  88.77  42.3  13.9  2.08  35.93  32.0 
3   Mauritania   1988  51.00  33.2  38.7  18.19  17.62  42.5 
4   Morocco   1991  110.77  48.4  21.3  4.97  37.09  39.2 
5   Tunisia   1990  184.24  73.5  19.1  5.32  53.05  40.0 
6   Jordan   1991  139.09  57.1  19.2  4.26  44.45  40.7 
7   Botswana*   1986  53.67  33.81  54.46  25.63  17.90  54.2 
8   Cote d’Ivore   1988  65.00  36.38  30.10  8.86  25.67  36.9 
9   Gabon   1977  133.04  55.16  46.22  21.64  29.34  62.9 
10   Guinea   1995  28.42  28.61  63.68  34.43  13.14  46.9 
11   Guinea Bissau   1991  37.27  30.35  61.86  34.81  13.27  56.2 
12   Kenya   1992  49.95  33.00  59.40  28.42  17.21  57.9 
13   Lesotho   1987  80.79  40.21  45.77  21.79  21.07  56.0 
14   Madagascar   1993  31.72  29.25  65.48  27.97  16.76  43.5 
15   Mauritius   1991  278.79  117.50  16.01  4.24  86.38  36.6 
16   Niger   1992  32.40  29.38  61.06  21.59  18.99  36.2 
17   Nigeria   1993  62.85  35.88  40.03  17.53  20.17  44.9 
18   Rwanda   1983  36.34  30.17  50.03  13.12  22.25  29.1 
19   Senegal   1991  63.04  35.93  49.66  22.67  19.53  54.1 
20   South Africa   1993  229.20  92.75  45.61  23.50  44.96  61.1 
21   Tanzania   1993  26.00  28.15  70.95  30.50  16.05  38.1 
22   Uganda   1993  30.18  28.95  67.42  27.64  17.08  40.7 
23   Zambia   1976  52.13  33.48  52.42  24.24  18.00  52.0 
24   Zimbabwe   1990  58.52  34.89  57.56  26.07  19.09  56.8 
25   Bangladesh   1986  45.45  32.04  41.67  12.86  22.15  39.0 
26   China   1992  132.06  54.85  18.75  7.26  33.61  37.3 
27    India    1992  44.21  31.78  40.84 10.37 23.71  32.0 
28   Indonesia    1993  107.72  47.47  10.68  1.19  42.18  31.7 
29   Malaysia   1989  182.51  72.79  28.43  9.37  48.80  48.4 
30   Pakistan   1991  80.29  40.09  15.13  3.42  31.03  31.1 
31   Philippines   1988  104.00  46.41  29.31  9.23  31.80  46.7 
32   Sri Lanka   1990  85.10  41.31  12.94  2.18  34.35  30.1 
33   Bolivia   1990  71.57  37.94  34.46  11.50  25.28  42.0 
34   Brazil   1989  282.15  119.31  48.05  23.42  61.16  60.7 
35   Chile   1994  226.66  91.57  38.10  14.95  55.64  56.5 
36   Columbia   1991  226.43  91.47  28.34  11.81  53.35  50.3 
37   Costa Rica   1989  191.14  76.23  25.69  10.42  45.31  46.1 
38   Dom. Rep.   1989  124.93  52.60  32.80  11.90  33.52  50.8 
39   El Salvador   1977  91.97  43.11  39.72  13.44  28.52  47.5 
40   Guatemela   1989  155.93  62.88  40.84  20.51  31.30  59.9 
41   Hondouras   1992  77.12  39.30  41.05  16.94  23.08  51.8 
42   Jamaica   1993  120.71  51.31  17.63  4.02  39.61  37.9 
43   Mexico   1989  300.86  129.66  38.20  16.45  73.82  55.3 
44   Nicaragua   1993  59.83  35.19  47.02  19.82  20.36  50.1 
45   Panama   1989  140.35  57.54  38.19  19.87  27.60  56.8 
46   Peru   1994  155.22  62.63  24.86  8.21  41.95  45.1 
47   Trinindad**   1981  233.12  94.57  24.35  11.74  48.97  41.6 
48   Venzuela   1990  304.78  131.88  38.05  15.39  78.54  53.8 
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Annex table (A. 5): Average Income of the Poor and Openness Measures in a Sample of Developing Countries 









Average Monthly  
Income of the Poor 
(US$: PPP) 
WTOAV OPENAV OPENADJAV SWAV GINI  
(%) 
Jordan  1991  159  53  40. 24  0  0.349  -0.455  0.75  40. 66 
Mauritania  1993  55  31  20. 19  1  0.415  -0.069  0  50. 05 
Tunisia  1990  141  47  32. 83  0.2  0.381  -0.122  0.4  40. 20 
Yemen  1992  44  31  19. 77  0  0.088  -0.317  1  39. 50 
Burundi  1992  45  31  22. 35  1  0.0819  -0.431  0  33. 33 
B.  Faso 1994  32  31  16.  32  1  0.153  -0.1978 0  48.  20 
Bolivia  1990  106  35  29. 16  0.2  0.1283  -0.056  1  42. 04 
Brazil  1993  200  67  33. 61  1  0.0912  0.162  0.5  61. 55 
Chile 1992  265  88  55.41  1  0.239  0.079 1  50.  70 
China  1990  55  31  22. 01  0  0.063  0.194  0  34. 60 
Cote d I￿voire  1993  66  31  23. 52  1  0.332  -0.069  0  36. 91 
Colombia  1995  208  69     40. 23  1  0.157  -0.023  1  57.40 
Costa Rica  1996  181  60    39. 30  1  0.419  -0.068  1  47. 08 
Dominican Rp.  1989  155  52   34. 55  1  0.284  -0.2  0  50.46 
Ecuador  1994  164  55  39. 66  0  0.197  -0.093  0.33  43. 00 
Ethiopia  1995  22  18  11. 73  0  0.077  -0.141  0  40. 00 
Guinea  1991  46  31  14. 99  0  0.245  -0.256  1  46. 80 
G Bissau  1991  42  31  13. 31  0  0.143  -0.507  1  56. 12 
Guatemala  1987  148  49  29. 20  0  0.142  -0.34  1  58. 26 
Guyana  1993  69  31  20. 81  1  0.665  0.16  0  40. 22 
Honduras  1996  76  31  17. 18  0.6  0.315  -0.227  1  53. 72 
Jamaica 1993  117 42  35.  65  1  0.6514  0.18  0  37.  92 
Korea  1993  355  119  88. 62  1  0.397  0.023  1  31. 59 
Lesotho  1993  91  31  15. 7 2  1  0.434  -0.012  0  57. 94 
Madagascar  1993  45  31  20. 03  1  0.145  -0.104  1  46. 85 
Mexico  1995  330  110  74. 91  1  0.186  0.145  0  53. 73 
Mali  1994  33  31  15. 78  0.4  0.208  -0.113  1  50. 50 
Mongolia  1995  68  31  22. 27  0        0.66  33. 20 
Mozambique  1996  66  31  20. 85  1  0.077  -0.209     39. 61 
Mauritius  1991  289  97  86. 82  1  0.439  -0.122  0  39. 63 
Malaysia  1995  275  92  70. 66  1  0.73  0.32  1  48. 52 
Niger  1992  28  24  16. 19  1  0.132  -0.178  1  36. 10 
Nigeria  1991  50  31  17. 05  1  0.143  -0.09  0  37. 02 
Nicaragua  1993  92  31  19. 91  1  0.195  -0.296  0.25  50. 30 
Nepal  1995  75  31  27. 01  0  0.058  -0.282  0.5  38. 78 
Panama  1995  164  55  26. 63  0  0.503  0.015     57. 07 
Peru  1994  149  50  36. 66  1  0.162  0.006  0.33  42. 76 
Philippines  1991  103  34  26. 28  1  0.235  0.001  0.6  46. 08 
Puerto Rico  1989  485  162  93. 40  0           50. 86 
Paraguay  1991  136  46  37. 25  0  0.405  0.15  0.4  59. 13 
Senegal  1991  75  31  17. 06  1  0.283  -0.167  0  54. 12 
Salvador  1989  125  42  15. 02  0  0.183  -0.373  0  48. 96 
Thailand  1992  177  59  37. 56  1  0.276  0.023  1  51. 50 
T. and Tobago  1988  399  133  98. 92  1  0.289  -0.266  0  42. 60 
Turkey  1994  205  69  49. 74  1  0.182  -0.121  1  49. 00 
Tanzania  1991  41  31  20. 26  1  0.123  -0.164  0  59. 01 
Uruguay  1989  269  90  58. 53  1  0.191  -0.205  0  42. 33 
Venezuela  1993  421  140  91. 05  0.8  0.163  -0.062  0.75  41. 68 
S. Africa  1993  157  53  27. 19  1  0.293  0.062  0.25  62. 30 
Zambia  1991  34  31  17. 87  1  0.359  0.015  0  43. 51 
Zimbabwe  1990  62  31  17. 98  1  0.1825  -0.103  0  56. 83 
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Annex table (A. 6): Globalization Measures and Inequality in a Sample of Developing Countries 
Country  Survey 
Year 
Number of Immigrants 
to the US 
Annual Growth Rate of 
Trade/GDP Ratio 







Algeria 1995  603  -1.15  3  1  36.7 
Bangladesh 1995  6386 6.48  1.5  0  35.03 
Bolivia 1990  1820  1.87  56.9  0  43.44 
Brazil 1993  5133  6.51  21.6  0  61.55 
Burkina Faso  1994  17  -3.23  5.2  0  49.6 
Central African Republic  1992  9  2.95  19.4  0  56.4 
China, People’s Republic  1995  41490  1.61  10  0  41.49 
Colombia 1995  14108  5.86  30.9  0  57.4 
Costa Rica  1996  1504  4.43  43.3  0  47.08 
Cote d’Ivoire  1993  324  1.58  26.4  0  38.31 
Dominican Republic  1996  34830  1.94  24.9  0  48.71 
Ecuador 1994  8081  1.94  32.5  0  44.4 
Egypt 1991  4621  -1.4  19.2  1  33.4 
El Salvador  1995  27052  6.22  14.8  0  49.86 
Ethiopia 1995  4876  1.75  12.4  0  41.4 
Gambia, The  1992  161  -3.99  30.6  0  49.2 
Ghana 1997  3646  4.1  15  0  34.1 
Guinea 1991  94  -2.01  6.9  0  48.2 
Guinea-Bissau 1991  56  -1.86 14.1  0  57.52 
Guyana 1993  7750  4.01  93.4  0  41.62 
Honduras 1996  7163  -0.55  22.5  0  53.72 
India 1993  37634  5.99  3.6  0  32.92 
Jamaica 1993  18050  1.21  45.4  0  39.32 
Jordan 1997  4016  0.92  19.3  1  37.82 
Kenya 1992  1392  3.03  8.2  0  55.79 
Lesotho 1993  8  -3.29  262.7  0  59.34 
Madagascar 1993  34  1.07  7.2  0  44.84 
Malawi 1993  57  -0.05  24.5  0  63.4 
Malaysia 1995  1520  4.35  65.3  0  48.52 
Mali 1994  76  1.06  13.7  0  51.9 
Mauritania 1993  29 -2.57  10.7  1  51.45 
Mauritius 1991  60  0.26  9.6  0  38.09 
Mexico 1995  266403  9.26  16.4  0  53.73 
Morocco 1990  1931  1.56  16  1  40.6 
Mozambique 1996  54  -2.97  22.4  0  41.01 
Namibia 1993  26  -0.001  49.4  0  75.73 
Nepal 1995  347  8.49  2  0  40.18 
Nicaragua 1996  9934  6.56  48.1  0  57.07 
Niger 1992  117  1.47  20.1  0  37.5 
Nigeria 1997  6923  1.99  44.5  0  51.96 
Pakistan 1996  12210  -0.34  17.2  0  32.6 
Panama 1995  2497  -2.28  69.9  0  57.07 
Papua New Guinea  1996  16  3.82  53.5  0  52.3 
Paraguay 1991  502  3.84  20.6  0  39.74 
Peru 1994  11041  4.11  15.5  0  46.27 
Philippines 1997  51755  7.02  14.9  0  47.56 
Senegal 1991  456  -1.77  14.9  0  55.52 
South Africa  1993  2240  5.28  39.5  0  58.25 
Sri Lanka  1995  1092  3.28  14.2  0  35.76 
Tanzania 1991  444  -0.08  11.2  0  60.41 
Thailand 1998  5214  2.02  17.5  0  42.76 
Tunisia 1990  206  -0.3  57  1  41.6 
Turkey 1994  2617  7.1  4.4  0  49 
Venezuela 1993  3005  3.56  20.9  0  41.68 
Vietnam 1992  42720  19.27  55.6  0  34.1 
Yemen 1992  1632  0.13  16.1  1  40.9 
Zambia 1996  213  0.22  58.4  0  51.2 
Zimbabwe 1990  276  7.86  18.6  0  58.23 
          Source: USNIS (2001), UNCTAD (2001), World Bank (2001) and  Dollar and Kraay  (2002) data set. 